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sheldon.wein@gmail.com

All zero tolerance arguments (both fallacious and non-fallacious ones) take the
standard form of practical reasoning (or pragmatic argumentation). And Lewiński’s
formulation of such arguments is perfectly acceptable:
I.
II.
Ergo:
III.

Y (a social goal) is desirable.
X leads to Y.
We should do X.

And he is certainly correct in claiming the causal premise (II. above) is usually the
important one and I am happy to accept his formulation of that premise (X is the
best, that is, most cost effective, means to achieving Y). And I accept Lewiński’s points
that more needs to be done to characterize the idea of “best means” of achieving
something. For instance, I see now that I was implicitly assuming that both those
advancing the argument and their audience would agree on what side constrains
had to be avoided in order for some means to count as “the best” in the
circumstances, so that when doing a cost-benefit analysis one excluded all those
means that involved (say) serious human rights violations. Of course, in many
situations that assumption does not hold.
The important point is that when one looks at zero tolerance arguments this
way, my view is that good zero tolerance arguments are those which at least
approach closely enough an adequate account of why each of the six features (full
enforcement, a lack of prosecutorial discretion, a strict constructivist interpretation,
strict liability, mandatory punishment, and a harsh punishment) is needed to
achieve the end in the best (most cost-effective) means. And, since in most cases
where people advance arguments that a zero tolerance policy is needed to deal with
a social problem they fail to come even close to saying the six conditions, in most
cases where one argues for a zero tolerance problem one is committing the zero
tolerance fallacy.
Lewiński raises the question of whether we should allow that some
arguments for unworthy goals should be given a laudatory title such as “good” or
“valid”. On this matter I side with those that are willing to hold that good arguments
can be produced for bad ends. It might be that there is a good argument for me to
abandon my children—they deprive me of things I value (money, my sanity,
sleep!)—yet, of course, were I to act on this good argument I would be doing
something quite wrong. So, just as we can talk sensible about a good assassin (one
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who ensures her victim dies), we can talk about good zero tolerance policies for evil
ends. Of course, we ought to work to rid the world of assassins (and especially of the
“good” ones). And, that a zero tolerance policy is the best means of achieving an end
which is itself evil is all the more reason to avoid adopting that zero tolerance policy.
(This is one of those situations where it might be wise to say that such an argument
committed the zero tolerance fallacy, even if one knew that it did not.)
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